Charles Duelfer | The Search For Truth In Iraq | Page 11

Lavrov-Kerry Agreement on Syria-Now What?

Posted on September 14, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Sometimes things work out. This may be one of those occasions. It appears the US has agreed with the general Lavrov proposition that an arrangement similar to what was imposed upon Saddam in the 1990’s be applied to Syria. This is a good thing. It can work and if it does not, it will be apparent quickly.

The agreement as issued today by the US State Department describes a hybrid arrangement making use of the existing secretariat and technical staff created for the Chemical Weapons Convention in the Hague, supplemented by additional measures. The role of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Committee in directing the inspections is not precise. Moreover, it would seem that what is still missing is a chairman for the Syrian disarmament case.

The rough mechanism follows a well understood (at least by alumni of the Iraq disarmament experience and the OPCW technical group) process whereby the weapons inspectors verify what Syria declares. The burden of proof, security, access to sites, access to information, all the heavy lifting, is on Syria. The inspectors direct, supervise, and evaluate the process, providing reports to the UN Security Council.

The next key step is to select a leader of the UN team. This is a job that is both technical but also requires political/diplomatic skills. It has to be someone trusted by a range of participants. Usually, an ambassador or senior official from a country viewed as neutral in the circumstances is picked. In this case, the Norwegian Ambassador to the UN, Geir Pedersen could be a good choice.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry created and extensive manual on how to create and implement a weapons inspection regime–drawing upon the experiences of a broad range of former weapons inspectors and diplomats. They are a major contributor to the UN and have experience in disarmament matters. Ambassador Pedersen knows this and the UN system in New York.

Whoever is selected will have to act fast, assembling a team of experts and, critically, establishing the procedures and modalities to be implemented on the ground in Syria. They need to have clear rights of immediate access to information, sites, people, etc. They must have the full and rapid support of Syria. My guess is a team of perhaps 50 may be needed between inspectors on the ground and support staff. It looks like the OPCW technical group is geared up and can provide the bulk of expertise needed.

On the Syrian side, they need to appoint a counterpart who will be cooperative and authoritative in dealing with the inspectors. It needs to be someone who can make and implement decisions in response to the UN inspectors requests. This, too, is critical. At some level, there either will be trust or not between the head of the UN team and the Syrian counterpart. On the ground, there are inevitably problems of implementation. They have to be worked out on the ground. The Syrians and UN inspectors have to be able to do this without going back to the UN Security Council regularly. If they can’t, the agreement will not work.

So far, what is presented about the Lavrov-Kerry agreement seems feasible. In any case, there will be very early indicators if it is going to work. Be prepared for problems along the way, but accounting for Syrian CW by this process stands a good chance of being more effective in meeting President Obama’s goals for a military strike, i.e. to deter and degrade Syrian CW capacity.

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Lavrov’s Plan

Posted on September 11, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has offered a plan that could provide a way out of the Obammá Syrian dilemma. Lavrov, who was Russian ambassador to the UN during the height of the Iraqi-UN weapons inspection activities, seems to have gotten Bashar al-Assad to agree to surrender his weapons to international weapons inspectors. This very close mirrors, on the surface, what we (UNSCOM, where I was the Deputy Executive Chairman) did in Iraq. I would point out that despite the international drama about our inspections–and there were many crises over access and deceptions by Iraq–it turned out we did a much better job disarming Iraq than anyone knew at the time.

It can work in Syria. However, there are critical elements that must be agreed in advance. First, there must be clear agreement that the burden of proof is on Syria. The inspectors must received declarations of CW inventory, production capacity, stocks of bulk chemical agent, munitions, etc. from the government. Then, they must have the authority to collect data to verify these data–interviews of individuals, access to sitea and documents. On access to sites, the inspectors must be able to go to sites they select as well as any the the government declares.

Other issues are the responsibility for security and movement of materials. That should be the reponsibilty of Damascus. Further, in Iraq, we ran a site (Muthana State Establishment) where we supervised the destruction of Iraqi mustard and sarin stocks using a hyudrolysis plant and an incinerator. Our international team (headed by a Dutch Army expert) operated for two years to safely (and inexpensively) destroy Iraq’s large inventory. This could also be done in Syria. Moving the weapons out of Syria would be extremely complicated, dangerous and expensive.

Interestingly the Norwegian government funded a guidebood laying out all the procedures and policy decisions requred for quickly establishing exactly this kind of system. (The Norwegian UN Ambassador’s office in New York will have this.) It is an unbiased manual that could inform the inevitable debate in the Security Council. I commend it highly (full disclosure: I consulted with the group preparing it based on my UN experience at UNSCOM)

One key point in the upcoming debate. Will the UN create this under Chapter 7 of the UN charter as France seems to favor? The is UN jargon for linking Syrian compliancde to the use of force. Russia has said that if Syria agrees, the use of force must be taken off the table. In the case of Iraq, there were two incentives to comply, one was the threat of military action, but the second was the existence of sanctions that would not be lifted until Iraq satisfied the weapons inspectors. What are the incentives for Syria? My guess is that wheterh or not the threat of force is explicit in whatever UN language is agreed, there will be an implicit threat based on the statements by the White House concering its unilateral interest in punishing Damascus for using CW. President Obama seems willing to suspend his sentence depending on Syrian good behavior as verified by UN inspectors acting as parole officers.

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At times like this, What would Saddam do?

Posted on September 5, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Among the various rationales expressed for a military strike on Syria is that need to make Bashir al-Assad pay a price for using CW. But what does Bashir value?

We learned from debriefing Saddam that his value structure was much different than ours. For example, he did not think he “lost” the war in Kuwait. He had taken on the last superpower and survived. In his mind, that was an accomplishment. What other Arab leader had done that? Saddam saw value in struggle itself. Being attacked by the United States gave him internal support in some ways.

Among the many uncertainties about attacking Syria is that we don’t really know for sure what will hurt him.

In December 1998, President Clinton ordered a 4-day bombing campaign against Iraq to cause Saddam to pay a price for insufficient cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. He did this despite the fact that the UN Security Council did not agree on this action–and then Russian Ambassador (now Foreign Minister) Sergei Lavrov was particularly vociferous in denouncing it. The targets, which were a bunch of buildings loosely associated with possible WMD programs, were not seen by Iraq as particularly important.

After that operation, I spoke with the Iraqi ambassador to the UN with whom I had a long relationship with (as Deputy Head of the UN inspection team UNSCOM). He said, “If we had known that was all you were going to do, we would have ended cooperation with the weapons inspectors long ago.”

It was not clear then what the objective was for the bombing other than something had to be done as a consequence of Saddam not complying with the demands of the inspectors. Following that bombing inspectors were not allowed back in Iraq. Saddam was happy with the outcome. The US felt like it did something. And the Security Council attended to other matters.

This feels like a moment when there is no consensus on the primary objectives, but a general feeling that we (the US) should do something and that something usually means blowing something up. Hopefully it won’t make things worse. But know one can really predict.

Who knows how Bashir al-Assad will react to whatever set of targets the US comes up with.

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Obama’s Speech to the UNGA: Two very different Versions

Posted on August 30, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

On September 17, will President Obama be explaining to the UN General Assembly why the US acted alone to respond to Syrian atrocities when the UN would not, or will he be chastising the UN for a lack of action, once again, to defend helpless citizens of Syria?
President Obama confronts a dilemma in dealing with the UN. He appears committed to military action in response to the apparent use of CW by Damascus. But, the UN process will not explicitly validate a military action—certainly not in the Security Council where Russia and China have vetoes.

This stasis occurs despite a trend of UN standards and precedents of justifying outside intervention when a sovereign government assails or fails to protect, its own population.
US UN Ambassador Susan Rice (now national security advisor) carefully worked this “responsibility to protect” standard in Libya. UN Resolutions 1970 and 1974, which Russia supported, embodied this standard. The failure to protect was seen as sufficient for outside military intervention. Ambassador Rice and others (including Kofi Annan) have been trying to build a legal framework so the international community can, indeed, would be obligated to act in the face of genocides and other horrors like Rwanda, Kosova, Darfur, etc.
But now the UN is viewed in Washington as a roadblock or at least a speed bump—much the way George Bush viewed it in 2002. President Bush said on September 12, 2002, “All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?“

Will President Obama allow the weapons inspection process play out? This could add weeks of waiting for the results of laboratory analysis of samples taken. Moreover, the outcome is not 100% certain. It could muddy the waters with conclusions that CW was used—possibly with victims showing exposure on both sides. If is quite possible that some samples taken from Syrian soldiers could show evidence of nerve agent exposure—Russia (especially FM Lavrov.
What if the preponderance of an attack was conducted by the regime, but there were isolated cases of rebel use of even small inefficient amounts of CW?
What if the US intelligence suggests that there was a confused command structure that was unclear about who ordered the use? Or that implied that Bashir did not know of the attacks?
When President Obama addresses the UN General Assembly in a couple weeks, does he want to be justifying a unilateral attack on Syria not premised on protecting US security, but on humanitarian grounds? And then the evidence goes wobbly? (Recall Secretary Colin Powell’s performance in the UN Security Council portraying the evidence of Saddam’s WMD programs which melted away afterwards.)
Or does President Obama want to be chastising the UN for once again not acting in the face of yet another horrendous act by a government against its own people?
Given the range of uncertainties, and the potential for the US intelligence to be wobbly (and of course leaking) on such questions, on the surface, there seems ample cause for caution, at least for a couple of weeks. The UK parliament, in spite of a strong intelligence assessment from their Joint Intelligence Committee asserting multiple uses of CW by Damascus, seems to have opted for waiting this out.

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Syria CW: How Can We Make it Worse?

Posted on August 29, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Answer: The United States could destroy Bashir’s control over his chemical weapons.

ForeignPolicy.com and others report that communications intercepts suggest some confusion over the order to use CW. If you were to make a list of things to worry about, loss of control over the Syrian CW stocks would be at or near the top. One of the good things about Bashir to date has been that he at least controls these weapons.

If the United States feels compelled to attack Sryia, one popularly discussed target set is command and control. Well, that may be the last thing you want to do if you worry about CW getting dispersed among all sorts of bad actors. Even attacking possible CW sites with untried special munitions that could incinerate (hopefully) CW stocks (but risking dispersing agent and munitions in the process) MIGHT be better. Maybe just hitting airfields/aircraft, completely unrelated to CW is a better way of causing Bashir to pay a price.

Related note: If the Administration releases transcripts of communications, be advised that these can be deceptively convincing. Written words can convey meaning not intended when they are spoken…especially when translated. Also, context is lost. For example, in Iraq we thought the Iraqi term for chemical weapons was pretty clear, but it turned out that they used the same term for white phosphorus munitions.

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Response to US attack – Cyber?

Posted on August 28, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

It is hard to imagine Moscow or Tehran or Damascus doing absolutely nothing in response to a US attack. Will it be Cyber? If I were Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, that’s what I would be talking about with President Putin.

Washington has telegraphed a kinetic attack against some set of Syrian targets. There will be no question who did it. Washington is advertising the size and duration of the attack. If, as leaks are suggesting, the attack is 2-3 days it would appear to be about the same size or smaller than the strikes that President Clinton ordered in December 1998 against Iraq when their cooperation with UN weapons inspectors was found incufficient.

But, what will Syria, and others, do to respond to the US? The reponse may ber less directly attributable–especially if the Russians or Iranians play a role.

One possibility is that we will experience, a real cyber attack that causes serious damage to US economic interests. The Syrian Cyber Army has claimed credit for hacking the NY Times twitter today. This is an area where covert aid from Russian or Tehran could provide maker a big difference and be a good option for those parties. Real damage could occur to the US and we probably would not be able to attribute the blame on Moscow or other capitals.

The consequences of such an attack could be surprisingly large and the American people mystified at the price they have paid. Then what will the Administration do? Will we respond against Syria only? Respond against its backers Moscow or Tehran? We may not be able to tell if they helped Syria or not. Imagine the simple case that a handful of the worlds best offensive cyber experts join Syrian hackers for a few days in Damascus. If you believe what experts say about US infrastructure vulnerabilities then we could suffer real damage and be hamstrung about how to respond. The White House could find itself trying to manage a very different problem and conversation in a week or two.

If may be they we discover we have been hit and have little opportunity to respond in a way that doesn’t involve some escalation along a never before travelled path of cyber attack conflict.

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Sniper Attacks on UN Inspectors – Not Surprising

Posted on August 26, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Dr. Ake Seltron’s UN inspection team has now drawn sniper fire. Unfortunately, the UN inspectors are easy targets. To do their job, they have to be out in the open. Using highly visible UN SUVs may be questionable, but committed opponents can track team movements as they leave their hotels even in other vehicles.

Multiple parties have an interest in thwarting their activities. The Damascus regime itself not want them to do their job–but not want to be blamed for blocking them. Sniper fire is anonymous and can be blamed on either side. Rebels could easily order sniper fire that would be attributed to the Bashir Regime. The inspectors are going into a no-man’s land where many have died and no one will ever know who killed them.

During UN inspections in Iraq, the government was explicitly responsible for the safety of the UN teams–and for the most part they did this. There was not an on-going conflict. Damascus, apparently has made no such assurances for the current team. Likely, they have simply said, if you go into rebel territory, we can offer no protection. You are on your own.

Ake Sellstrom, the team leader, must make a careful choice about the risks his team will endure. Today he experienced a warning in this mornings attack which caused no injuries.

I lost four people and several severely wounded while leading the US Iraq Survey Group mission in Iraq during 2004. This included a VBIED attack on my own armored car (claimed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Two very good men were killed.

Dr. Sellstrom will need to make a decison about the risks of conducting his mission and how much he will learn that can’t be known any other way. Knowledge can be very costly. If the team sustains casualties, will UN leaders be able to say to the surviving relatives that the mission was worth it? Horrible choices face the weapons inspectors in so many ways.

The Secretary General should not leave the decison on proceeding with the team’s mission only to the team leader. They will be inclined to go, no matter the danger. Secretary Ban needs to take responsibility for that decison as well. He is in the best position to know the value of the expected results in the context of the overall objectives.

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Syrian Agreement for Inspections–Why?

Posted on August 25, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

If Damascus is permitting the weapons inspectors access to the sites of recent apparent CW attack sites (as reported Sunday 25 August 2013) then why, if they had a role in the recent attacks?

First, the weapons inspectors are only mandated to determine if CW agents had been used, not who used them. If the government was behind the attacks, the inspectors will only publicly confirm what appears obvious, that chemical agents were used. Damascus, could still maintain that there remains some ambiguity about who was responsible. Whatever the UN inspectors declare, it will be less definitive than what Washington is likely to declare. The result will still be that there is not a uniform international view on who is responsible (unless Russia and Iran are suddenly persuaded to reverse course on supporting Bashir–which would be a big surprise).

Second, if the US is now determined to conduct attacks on Syria, then the US will look bad if it launches strikes before the UN inspection process plays out. In a way, this would replicate the circumstances of George W. Bush in spring of 2003 when UN inspectors were still investigating on the ground when President Bush concluded independently of the UN that the time for military action had arrived. President Obama may find himself in the uncomfortable position of hoping the inspectors don’t get into the areas if the reports about taking military action are true.

As for the inspectors, they will have a difficult time operating in the area that is in rebel control. It’s obviously dangerous. Things can appear calm one moment–deceptively–and then attacks can occur. The areas may be contaminated. The sites have not been secure and evidence at some sites may have been “seeded”.” Nevertheless, they can take samples from the enviroment and victims, they can interview witnesses, they can collect debris, plot dispersal patterns, etc. These are all important…even after the passage of time.

As an aside, while their mandate is not to attribute responsibility for the attacks, data they collect, could point to the originator of the attack. For example, if they find debris of the munitions used to disperse the agent, that could say something about the origin. they nature of the munitions can tell something of the sophistication and potentially the manufacturer. For example, some CW munitions keep two separate reservoirs of constituent components of Sarin agent that are only mixed when a diaphram is broken when the munition is launched…thus the sarin is only created at the moment of use. This would indicate a sophisticated military weapon, not an ad hoc creation by non-state actors. But this is only one of dozens of things that inspectors might find.

The next few days will pose some dilemmas for all involved.

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Syria CW Use: Who crossed whose red-line?

Posted on August 23, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Did Bashir cross Obama’s redline, or the other way around? The perspective in Damascus may be different.

The Syrian situation has taken yet another turn for the worse. Which is to say it has become even more unpredictable.
The apparent use of a large coordinated chemical weapons attack on civilian targets by the Bashir regime whilst the UN inspection team was sitting in a hotel in Damascus suggests that deterrence has failed. But who was deterring whom?
I can not pretend to understand the mindset or logic of Bashir, but however he calculates costs and benefits or risks and gains, he seems to think ramping up defiance of the international community and increasing terror among Syrians is the path to take at the moment.
One possible explanation could be linked to Bashir’s previous statements that he would not use CW so long as there was no external intervention. Perhaps in his mind, there has been external intervention in the form of the infiltration of opposition forces trained in Jordan by the US, French and possibly the Israelis as reported in Le Figaro (22 August 2013). Bashir may have concluded that the outside world (and indeed the US) had crossed his redline, not the other way around.
For Washington, the Syrian war cannot be separated from the further complexities of grating tensions in the rest of the region. Jordan is extremely vulnerable and if it King Abdullah loses control of Jordan, then the chaos in the region will have gotten vastly worse.
For the White House, Syria also cannot be separated from domestic politics. President Obama has to be able to say he is doing something about Syria. The chemical weapon attack videos will force this even more.
Chemical weapons use stands out among the intersecting dynamics that no one can understand. Latching on to that salient element is perhaps unavoidable because it is tangible and the videos are so horrible. But, it is only one aspect of a tragedy that is spinning out of control.
In some ways Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is correct in condemning intervention because we cannot really predict the consequences. His comments that perhaps Syrian rebels caused the chemical weapons attack may seem ludicrous, but his objective is to thwart action military action that has no clear outcome.
Lavrov, it is worth remembering, was Russian ambassador to the UN during the key crises between UN weapons inspectors and Iraq in the 1990’s. At one point he accused the UN weapons inspectors of introducing nerve agent samples into Iraq—in effect planting evidence. It had the desired effect of shifting rational debate in the Security Council away from Iraq—whom Russia was supporting. Lavrov is very shrewd and has purpose behind his statements.
In the days ahead, I would carefully watch for Lavrov’s reactions. Russian dialogue with Damascus will have far more influence over Bashir’s behavior than statements from the White House.
Finally, the use of chemical weapons also indicates that the chemical stocks are no longer concentrated at a small number of secure sites. The risk of the dispersal or complete loss of control of these weapons in the Syria is growing. The US cannot confidently bomb these sites to destroy them. There are too many and the aftermath would likely make any accountability for the weapons impossible. In a sense, this risk allows Bashir to deter the US.

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UN Inspectors to Syria

Posted on May 7, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Many comparisons are being made between the Syrian and Iraqi circumstances regarding CW use.
Some background on the Iraqi case. The UN first became involved in Iraqi CW use allegations during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s. A small team of experts was constituted by the Secretary General to determine if CW had been used and by whom. They made separate investigations in 1984, 1986, and 1987. Most of their investigations were done outside the battle area (only in 1987 did they go into Iraq). Nevertheless, it was concluded that extensive CW use had occurred and was increasing. This was largely determined from the injuries–many were victims of blister agent (mustard) in addition to the nerve agent sarin. It was subsequently during the UNSCOM investigations of the 1990’s that Iraq used 101,000 chemical munitions against Iran. This was a massive military use–and it was very effective in countering the Iranian “human wave” attacks. By comparison with this use, the Syrian cases are minute–and they will consequently be far more difficult to investigate.
It is worth keeping in mind, that the use of CW in the Syrian case is quite different from the Iraq use against Iranian troops. The Iraqis had a military rationale. In Syria, the rationale for use–no matter who used them–doesn’t seem to be military, but to sow terror or cause international opprobrium.

The man selected to lead the UN investigation for the Secretary General, Dr. Ake Sellstrom, is a talented scientist who has strong experience–including as a weapons inspector in Iraq. He knows the difficulties in collecting data and credibly interpreting it for politicians who may seek to dispute any conclusions. It is important that there be at least one actor in this drama with an interest in establishing the truth. However, his task is going to be challenging if not impossible–even if he is permitted into Syria.

Sellstrom will have to provide his conclusions to an audience made up of political scientists for whom truth is a variable. I recall UN Security Council ambassadors twisted and coloring seemingly factual statements into shapes that suite their ends. Sergey Lavrov was brilliant at this. A redline in his hands would quickly become a flexcuff to bind the American ambassador to his/her chair. They didn’t stand a chance.

Other ambassadors could turn a seemingly direct linear presentation into a Calder mobile or a mobius strip. The Syrian situation is not one where the parties have a common interest in truth at this point. The politics needs to be fixed first. No matter how talented the UN inspectors, their truth will waste its sweetness upon the desert air.

Bearing in mind that the Syrian crisis is only about Syria for the Syrians. For all other parties, its about Iran, Jordan, Hezbollah, Israel, etc. The dynamics are far too complex for party to understand the knock-on consequences of any act. We don’t understand the range of dynamics, nor the perimeter of the problem we are trying to solve. It is a systemic flaw of our democracy and position as the leading power, that we are supposed to have a view on how to fix every problem on earth. At the daily noon press briefing at the White House all questions get raised–of course including Syrian. “Can you tell us what the President is going to do to solve the Syrian calamity?” Imagine the press spokesman say, “Nothing. Its too complicated. It is impossible to map the consequences of any action, so we are going to do nothing.” That sort of honesty has little survival value in Washington.

It is clear that whatever the US does decide to do, it can not avoid coordinating with Russia. Kerry seems to be engaged in that. That is a good thing, though I bet it is unpleasant. Lavrov will be extremely difficult. He will remember being trampled in the UN Security Council during the Kosovo crisis by Madeleine Albright. The US gave short shrift to Russia and I strongly suspect Lavrov and others will, all other things being equal, be happy to jerk around the US. Still, unless there is some common ground mapped out between US and Russia, Syria and the region will continue a death spiral. Jordon is becoming more precarious. Lebanon stability is suffering.

Against these major dynamics, the issue CW use is important but not necessarily paramount. Only if there is a loss of control of CW will the regional powers and the US and Russia being drawn together quickly. If CW stocks look to be issued and deployed or shared in ways where the central government has no control, then the CW aspect of this disaster will become a dominant factor. Until that point is reached, the work of Dr. Sellstrom may be interesting but critical. And if the use is so small, the truth will be fungible and easily confused. A key question, if CW was used, is who used it? Was it the Syrian government forces? Confusion is already added by the statement of another part of the UN. Comments from Carla del Ponte of the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry in Syria suggesting the source of Sarin use was Syrian opposition forces.

Dr. Sellstrom, I admire your courage and wish you and your team the best in your search for truth.

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