Charles Duelfer | The Search For Truth In Iraq | Page 10

Syrian CW – The Slow Road to Latakia

Posted on February 3, 2014 by Charles Duelfer

Syria has will miss both target dates to remove its chemicals.  The most toxic amounts were due out at the end of the 2013 and the less dangerous components due out February 5th.   Security is not an excuse for the minimal progress so far.  And this is a strong reversal from the full compliance with earlier deadlines to eliminate munitions, production equipment and other CW facilities.

It appears that decisions in Damascus about CW are being taken in context of other issues—particularly the discussions in Geneva with Lahkdar Brahimi.  While Bashir al-Assad ponders his next moves, Norwegian, Danish, Russian and American ships will continue to steam around the Mediterranean waiting for Bashir to move forward.  Bashir al-Assad is expending whatever international credibility he accrued by agreeing to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and moving smartly this past fall to comply.

The Russians, who have been arguing Bashir’s case, will be having fits.  But unless the US and others raise the specter of doing something in response, then even Russian influence over Damascus regarding CW will be minimal.

Of course, the real problem now is not Syrian CW.   The real problem is the complete chaos with not path ahead for the Syrian conflict and its ripples beyond.  For the most part, the risk posed by Syrian CW is greatly diminished by the actions already taken.  However, as has always been the case, there are plenty of ways to kill civilians without chemical munitions.

The US may raise Syrian CW compliance in the UN Security Council shortly.  If they do, the question of “enforcement” action will be debated either openly or not.  Russians will oppose, but the Administration will find itself once again in a position where domestic pressures to “do something” will grow as they did in September when the President made his speech to the nation asking Congress for its agreement to conduct a limited military strike on Syria.

The President is planning travel to Saudi Arabia next month.  What does he want to be able to say?  Does he want to say we are thinking or doing something, or that we did something?  Bear in mind that the fact of the trip will also be a motivating factor for other parties—Israel, Al-Qaeda, Russia, Iran, Bashir al-Assad, and the US Congress.

I think the crews on the ships in the waiting to lift and destroy the Syrian chemicals may have a long deployment.

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Iran Nuclear Talks – Progress?

Posted on January 13, 2014 by Charles Duelfer

The announcement of the new elements coming from the talks with Tehran represents progress of a sort.  Basically there is a trade between Iran’s ongoing ability to enrich uranium (and produce plutonium) that could be used in a weapon and unblocking funds (and backing off on some sanctions for Iran).  Whether this “walks back” the Iran program significantly remains debatable.

Bear in mind, Iran can build a nuclear weapon.  It’s just a question of how long it would take.  Iran clearly has the intellectual capability and, currently, it has the industrial infrastructure to produce the specialized enriched nuclear material for a bomb.  They also have the ability to launch a weapon on their existing ballistic missiles.  The goal of those seeking to thwart an Iranian nuclear weapon has been to stop their progress towards a weapon and make the lead-time longer.  The recent agreement moves in the direction of lengthening the time it would take Tehran to accumulate the enriched nuclear material for a weapon.  It also improves the ability of IAEA weapons inspectors to detect cheating or a breakout by Iran.  Still we don’t know how long it would take Iran to build a weapon if it decided to.  The reason is we don’t know how much work Iran has done to design and test a weapon. They have refused to discuss this despite long efforts by the IAEA to engage them on this critical point.

This is the vital gap in the ongoing negotiations.  Until we know how far Iran has progressed in the design and testing of an actual bomb we have not succeeded.

A nuclear weapon requires enriched uranium or plutonium, but to make a weapon requires a very sophisticated design to cause compress and “ignite” the nuclear core.  This requires a lot of testing and very fine fabrication.  The international community does not have a good window into this.  The IAEA has been seeking access to facilities and individuals (particularly the Parchin facility) where substantial evidence points to Iranian “weaponization” development.

In essence, we can’t tell how far Iran is from a bomb because they have blocked—and still block—access to this data.    If the international community does not get a clear verifiable understanding of what progress Iran has made in “weaponization,” then sanctions and other measures should be swiftly reinstalled.

From Tehran’s perspective, if they come clean, they risk an international reaction that could block progress in sanctions relief.  Particularly if they have done significant weapons design testing.  It will be a tricky decision for Iran to make.

However, unless President Obama or Secretary of State Kerry can at some point stand up and say categorically that Iran has declared their full program, including its “weaponization” development (and describe publicly what it is/was) then no one should expect sanctions to be lifted.

I look forward to seeing a full public briefing of the Iranian nuclear program, to include details of it’s implosion design, triggering mechanism, fusing for use on a ballistic missile, etc. It may be embarrassing to Iran (and potential its supporters who may have assisted it).  

I also look forward to hearing how elaborate a future monitoring regime will be going forward.  If Tehran is earnest on these two points, then they should have an on-ramp back to the international political and financial community.  If not…

 

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Syrian CW – The Next Stage

Posted on January 7, 2014 by Charles Duelfer

OPCW head Mehmet Uzumcu announced today that the initial removal of some chemicals from Syria had taken place today.  Chemicals in their specially designed and built containers were loaded onto the Danish ship Ark Futura at the port of Latakia.  OPCW said some materials from 2 (of 12) locations were loaded.  Presumably the ship will go back out into the Mediterranean and sail around in circles until the next batch is ready to pick up. That’s not exciting.

Hold your breath though because insurgents could easily decide to hit a convoy headed to Latakia with an IED attack.

Starting the process to whittle done the stocks of mustard agent and sarin nerve agent chemical “precursors”  is good, but not amazing.

Bashir made his big decision in September and the guts of the Syrian CW facilities have already been demolished.  The Big decision now is whether insurgents will decide to attack.  They can if they want to.  Attacking convoys with IEDs was a specialty in Iraq.  The same guys who trained and taught those skills there are in Syria now.

Focus on the slippage in the UN’s own schedule (the target date was to have all these high priority chemicals out of Syria by 31 December) was overblown.

There are a lot of moving parts and a lot of chaos in Syria (and the UN).

Consider a partial list:

Russian trucks, Chinese monitors, US containers, UN staff supervisors, Syrian army staff, Norwegian and Danish ships, Russian ships, Chinese ships, Russian security at Latakia, US ship-borne destruction vessel (MV Cape Ray), clearance at an unnamed Italian Port for cargo transfer, secure (unannounced) ground transportation, 15-members of the Security Council who think they are important, a Nobel Prize-winning Chairman of OPCW who never expected to be doing any of this, etc.

Sergei Lavrov said to me in the mid-1990’s when he was Russia’s ambassador to the UN that American criticism of the UN was too harsh.  We focused on UN inefficiencies.  He said there was a Russian expression along the lines that, “It’s not that dancing bears dance well, but that they dance at all.”

The Remaining Risks.

Getting the chemical stocks to Latakia is the key risk.  Secrecy about the movements is a good thing—but probably hard to achieve on the ground.  There are 12 sites and the footprint of the convoys of armored trucks will be large.  An IED attack along one of the obvious routes has to be a major risk.  Surveillance of the routes by drones and electronic measures can mitigate but not eliminate such risks.  Intelligence about insurgents will be coming from a mix of sources and channeled to Syrian/Russian officers coordinating the convoy movements.  I doubt it will be very clear cut.  Again, the same guys who taught Iraqis how to make very effective IEDs (and rockets) are active in Syria. There is a lot of wisdom floating around about how to do these attacks. The US never solved that problem.

On the other hand, there is almost zero risk of back-sliding by the Damascus regime on its commitment to get rid of its CW.  Bashir has no use for CW now.  It may have served its purpose in deterring some actions by Israel, but in Syrians current circumstances its greatest utility is in the international legitimacy Bashir gets by ridding himself of it.  And Bashir made his tough decision back in September.

One other risk is the process of moving and destroying the chemicals once they leave Syria.  This is quite small.  The hype over the danger of accepting “chemical agents” into countries for destruction was way overblown.  Most of the chemicals are precursors to the final agent.  It sounds glib, but if they were just dumped in the ocean, it would not be a big deal—environmentally.  Politically, it would be a disaster or course.  Certainly countries have done that before on a vastly bigger scale.

Getting rid of Syrian CW is great.  We are doing it in a complicated way, but that’s international politics.  The real mess in Syria is not chemicals.  It’s a regional conflict that keeps getting worse.

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The Iran Nuclear Deal

Posted on November 27, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

 

 

It is difficult to be categorical when judging this agreement.

Much depends upon huge uncertainties that will play out over years or decades.  American politicians are condemned to focus on near-term costs and consequences.  Our system tends to discount the future very heavily—election cycles, business cycles, news cycles all drive decision-making focus on the near term.  We do not play a long game very well (if at all).  We tend to buy time in small increments.

Still, gazing further into the future, it is not hard to see a world where the US and Iran have more extensive relations—particularly economic.  The very youthful Iranian population will grow up.  It’s hard to see the next generation following the same path as the current Iranian leaders.

But you have to get to that future without things going horribly wrong.

Judging the immediate position regarding the narrow (but important) issue of Iran’s nuclear program should account for a few facts.

  1. This isn’t like Iraq.  There really is an Iranian nuclear program that is very advanced.  Iran has a very large nuclear infrastructure covering all aspects of nuclear work—whether peaceful or military.  Iran has the capacity to make nuclear weapons.  It is just a question of will.
  2. We do not know how much work Iran has done to develop a nuclear warhead.  The US was convinced there was a “weaponization program” that was suspended or otherwise halted (probably only temporarily) in 2003 coincident with the US invasion of Iraq.  Maybe they thought they were next.  Who knows?  The point is that no one other than the Iranians knows how developed and how well-tested a weapon design may be.  The recent agreement does nothing to answer this question.  In fact, one of the key items the IAEA seeks to clarify is just this point.  They have sought access to a military site (Parchin) where reports indicate Iran conducted explosive testing that would only be done for a nuclear weapon development program.  Iran must come clean on the status of its weaponization work if the international community (and the IAEA) wants to have effective monitoring in the future.  This is vital.
  3. Iran must declare all its enrichment capacity—to include centrifuge production capacity and parts.  To be able to monitor compliance in the future, there must be a solid baseline understanding of all enrichment capacity, not just the designated sites.
  4. Don’t forget Iran has long-range ballistic missile programs that appear best suited for nuclear warheads.  Those programs are continuing in earnest.  We are not talking about a country like Japan that has the talent and wherewithal to make nuclear weapons, but does not choose to compete in the military realm.  It makes its mark economically.
  5. What are the objectives of a deal with Iran?  It is unclear what the explicit goal of a final agreement is.  Is the goal to remove all Iranian capacity to enrich Uranium (or make plutonium)?  Or is the goal to cause Iran to have a detectable “breakout” time of no less than some period of time?
  6. There is a trade-off between enrichment and the need for very intrusive inspections.  If Iran had no enrichment capacity, then monitoring for a weapons program is much easier.  However, once some type of enrichment is accepted, then the pressures to conduct very intrusive monitoring go up substantially.  This is a trade that negotiators may put to Tehran.  If they want to enrich, then they should accept a very intrusive inspection regime.   If they do not want highly intrusive inspections, then they should relinquish enrichment capacity.

 Some other considerations.

Iran may have viewed the recent Syrian decision regarding its Chemical Weapons programs as an indicator that cooperation on WMD will buy them legitimacy.  Iran might also have concluded that a US military strike against Iran was really unlikely.  The spectacle of President Obama going to congress to get authorization for a limited bombing mission in Syria (and failure being all be assured) communicated something—probably not strength.  On the other hand, the strong sanctions put together over both the Bush and Obama administrations with international support is quite a powerful tool.  As we learned after the invasion of Iraq, Saddam’s highest priority was to get out of sanctions.  Incrementally he gave up his WMD to that end…the problem was no one believed him (and, of course, Saddam was going to rebuild his WMD capacity as soon as conditions permitted—this is the part many tend to forget).

The US is not in a strong position on Iran.  This administration is focused on domestic issues.  It seems international issues are evaluated first on their domestic consequences.  That is not unusual, but when President Obama says “all options are on the table,” it does not mean the same thing as when President Bush said the same.

Moreover, an objective assessment of the US role in the region would have to consider that the US is simply not as dominant as it was.  We are withdrawing though we don’t say that.  We are less needful of imported oil.  Our policies have tended to undermine long-time allies.  Many countries, particularly the Gulf States are realizing they are on their own and should not count of the US for support or leadership that suits them.  The world has changed.  Russia, China, France and others are rising in influence.

Under the circumstances, maybe we were lucky to get as good a deal as we got.  To get to the point of a final deal that is verifiable and truly removes any near term risk of an Iranian nuclear weapon will require a lot more.

Finally, once sanctions are off, no matter what anyone says, it will be near impossible to put them back on.  This was the elephant in the room during Security Council debates concerning Iraq’s compliance with WMD.  No one really believed that once sanctions were lifted, Saddam wouldn’t reconstruct his programs.  And there would not be the will to reimpose sanctions once the world was re-engaged in commerce with this wealthy country.  That was Saddam’s strategy and, absent the changed world after 9-11, it probably would have worked.

 

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Knowledge is Expensive – Veterans Day 2013

Posted on November 11, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Knowledge is Expensive

Veterans day celebrates those who have served the country in the military services.  There are many members of the military who served with me in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).  Overall there were more than 1500 people who participated in the ISG mission.

Four were killed. Six were very badly wounded.  Three of these individuals, by their actions, saved my life.

During Operation Hull, a successful effort to identify and curtail an insurgent effort to create chemical weapons, an explosion took place on April 26, 2004 that killed Sgt. Lawrence Roukey and Sgt. Sherwood Baker.  Badly wounded were:  SGT Michelle Hufnagel; SPC Brian Messersmith; SGT Darren Miles; SPC Ryan Owlett; and SGT Joseph Washam.

On November 8, 2004 I was travelling along airport road in a convoy and was attacked by a VBIED (a suicide bomber in a red Kia car loaded with several 155mm shells).  The following armored suburban drove to block the VBIED once they realized it was a threat.  The detonation killed SFC Clinton Wisdom and SPC Don Clary.  SPC Nathan Gray was seriously wounded.  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of al-Qa’ida in Iraq claimed credit.

Knowledge can be very expensive.   The lives lost during the Iraq Survey Group Mission were invaluable.

Lack of knowledge can also be very expensive.  That’s why we are in the intelligence business.  Sadly, knowledge, like wisdom, can come too late.

The ISG detailed the Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction problem and much more in a remarkable way.  The ISG report has been studied and is being studied to this day. It is a remarkable product with concrete consequences.

The United States, and indeed many countries involved in the Iraq developments have learned from this work.

Certainly at a personal level, I have spent a lot of time teaching lessons based on the ISG efforts to intelligence officers, policy makers, and other students of national security and foreign affairs during the last nine years.  Hopefully, some better decisions are being made today because of what we learned in Iraq.

As a case in point, I would point to the direction the United States and other countries have taken regarding Syrian Chemical Weapons.  Knowledge from the ISG is directly shaping those efforts.  We have steered a wiser, less destructive path drawing upon the lessons of Iraq and the ISG.  We know more about how regimes behave, more about the effectiveness of UN inspections, and more about the unintended consequences of military actions.  Decision-makers in Washington often learn on the job.  I am grateful that some reach back to those who had experience in the past to guide their efforts.

The Iraq Survey Group members who gave their lives and their families and friends have suffered enormous loss.  Others suffered grievous wounds and long rehabilitation.  Others risked their lives far from the safety of home to participate in the ISG.

I can only say thank you.

The Defense Intelligence Agency recognized those killed during service with the ISG last Thursday in a ceremony at DIA headquarters.  In the main entrance there is the Patriots Memorial, where plaques are displayed commemorating those who died in DIA service.  They added the four ISG members.  It was a somber reunion of ISG members.  Those I spoke with were proud of their service.

Most importantly, I hope the families of those killed derived something form the ceremony.  The mothers, sisters, wives, and children of these men who died nine years ago deserve our thanks.  I hope they got something out of the ceremony.  It was for them.

 

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Syrian CW – “Funtional Destruction”

Posted on October 31, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

The OPCW-UN inspectors for Syria have “completed the functional destruction of critical equipment for all of its declared chemical weapons production facilities and mixing/filling plants, rendering them inoperable.” 

This is seven weeks after President Obama, in a dramatic prime time address to the nation announced that he was seeking Congressional concurrence for a circumscribed military attack on Syria intended to “degrade and deter.”  The turn of events is striking.

(I am setting aside the potential that Syria may have concealed some CW capacity because in any case would be greatly reduced even if it is not zero.)

How is it that a country that built up a large chemical weapons capacity to offset Israel’s nuclear capability suddenly in a matter of a few weeks, gives it up?   Maybe CW just wasn’t that useful.  Bashir al-Assad is clearly fighting for the survival of his regime.  Deterring Israel is not his biggest problem.  CW has not proved to be very effective in a civil war.  It brings down the wrath of the international community and is not very effective, even to break the morale of the opposition.  There are lots of other ways of killing people with “conventional” weapons.

It is also the case that Bashir al-Assad needs international standing and only the Russians are doing much to support him—and they seem to have made the case to him that his case would be materially improved if he gave up CW.  Lavrov certainly would not have suggested the idea of UN inspectors handling the Syrian CW case if he was not convinced that Syria would deliver and not do anything “stupid.”

What exactly did OPCW destroy?  They won’t say.  Unlike the Iraq case where destruction was detailed in reports to the UN Security Council, OPCW inspectors have made public no information about the specifics of what they destroyed.

Reportedly Syria has asked to retain some facilities that can be used in civil chemical industry.  Maybe that’s a good idea, maybe not.

We do not know what specific munitions have been declared or destroyed.  Did they destroy Scud missiles or just the warheads?

Did the Syrians declare munitions of the type that were used in the August 21 attack that was investigated by the separate UN team?   (I understand they did not.)  There are many details that would provide more confidence to the Security Council than the OPCW is revealing.  I suspect that when the UN Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag becomes more familiar with her brief, she may wish to provide more fulsome data to the Security Council…whether this is standard OPCW practice or not.  Syria is a special case, as the special resolution by the Security Council mandating this process (just last September 27th) makes clear.  It is not like the average party to the CWC.

Nevertheless, the achievement of the OPCW-UN team is remarkable.  One of the last remaining states with CW has now been removed from the list.  Remaining are Egypt, North Korea, South Sudan, and Angola.  (Israel and Burma have signed but not ratified the CWC convention.)  Egypt is now more prominent for its position.  If there weren’t so many other difficulties in and around Egypt, it might be expected to follow suit.

What is likely to become more evident is that CW in the hands of non-state actors will be a problem.  In Iraq after the removal of Saddam and during the insurgency, there were attempts by various actors to use rudimentary CW.

Moreover, it is still not clear that insurgents did not use CW in Syria.  The evidence points to Damascus for the major cases of use, but that does not mean the rebels have not indulged in CW as well.

This risk of non-state actors using CW underlines the value in getting the Syrian materials off the table.  This is a positive, if unplanned or predicted outcome.  Still, there are plenty of ways of killing people, and the prospects for an early end to the killing in and around Syria doesn’t seem any closer.

Finally, there remains the task of getting rid of the chemical agents and precursors.  These are extremely important and dangerous.  It remains to be agreed if they will be removed quickly from Syria to a country that can safely render them harmless.  Norway was a prime candidate but declined.  Apparently still mulling over the task are others including Belgium and Albania (not as odd as it sounds…its not far and they have had the experience of getting rid of their own CW inventory when they acceded to the CWC).

 

 

 

 

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Syrian CW – Major Progress Continues – Who’s Left with CW?

Posted on October 18, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

While US media fixated on the budget scrum in Washington, things have been moving ahead toward the goal of eliminating Syrian CW.

 

Status. On the ground, inspectors are continuing to inventory and verify Syrian facilities, equipment and munitions.  They are supervising and recording the destruction of the easy parts, i.e. the non-toxic parts, production/filling equipment, empty munitions and delivery mechanisms.  The UN Security Council gave them a deadline of November first. They are working towards that deadline with the constrained staff they have available.  Even if they are not able to meet that goal fully because of security or other reasons, they will have accomplished a big step.  There first report to the Security Council will be very interesting to see the list of material destroyed.

 

There will also be key decisions to be made about particular pieces of equipment and munitions to be destroyed.  Some equipment could be used for civil purposes and Syria could argue to retain some.  There may also be disputes over which munitions need to be destroyed.  For example, should just the CW specific warheads be destroyed or the missiles that launch them as well?  Look for discussion of these matters in the first report of the team.

 

Secretary Ban Ki Moon named the head for this activity just a few days ago.  The new Coordinator is Sigrid Kaag, who has solid UN experience and speaks Arabic.  She is not an expert in disarmament, but should be able to navigate the UN Security Council. She could use a good technical deputy.   I would note that the individual who headed the UNSCOM destruction group that destroyed an inventory probably bigger than Syria’s from 1992-1994 was a Dutch Army Colonel Chemical Weapons expert named Cees Wolterbeek.  He had a PhD in chemistry and did an extraordinary job with a team from Russia, US, Germany, France, and UK. He was great.

 

Norway–A player?  For less than the cost of one F-35, a major boost to international security?  

Behind the scenes now are discussions to find a country or countries that will accept for destruction some of the component chemicals of Syrian nerve agent.  There may also be some amount of mustard agent.  Norway is one potential participant.  This action would be a huge way to contribute to disarmament.  (Certainly the Norwegian Nobel committee–which is chosen by the Norwegian parlement would seem to agree. The five members decided to give the OPCW this year’s peace prize.) Wild statements about cost have been made, often by drawing comparison with the bills the Pentagon has run up to destroy the US inventory–$35 billion and counting.  If the Pentagon could find a more expensive way of doing it, they would have.

At the opposite end of the scale, I would note that UNSCOM eliminated the Iraqi inventory (albeit in Iraq and under different circumstances) for under $10 million.  My guess is that eliminating the Syrian inventory would cost Norway much less than a single F-35 aircraft—about half the price probably.  And the contribution to international security will be far greater.  Norway’s new government can make a real difference that would help both US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.  

 

CW going the way of Small Pox.  It is important to recognize that the chemicals that are likely to be removed from Syria are the precursors to the nerve agent.  Syria’s nerve agent inventory was kept as a “binary” agent, meaning that for storage, the two components of the agent or “precursors” were kept separate, mixed only just prior to use—like epoxy glue.  One component is a type of alcohol and likely will be destroyed in Syria…its simple.  The other component, while toxic, is not a lethal agent itself.  This and some relatively small amount of Mustard agent may be removed from Syria for destruction.  It will be take careful planning to move the material to a port.  This seems the quickest and most secure way of destroying the inventory.

 

It is worth keeping in mind that the Syrian inventory is the last big chunk of known CW inventory in the world.  US and Russia are continuing their destruction efforts but their stockpiles are long since unusable.  Removing Syria’s inventory leaves only a few countries with likely, limited stockpiles.  We are very close to getting rid of a class of weapons—it reminds me of eliminating small pox.  Sure there are lots of ways of killing people left, but a particularly indiscriminate and ugly one is close to eradication.  One small bright spot in a region notably lacking in such things.

 

The countries outside of the CWC are:  Egypt, North Korea, Southern Sudan, and Angola.  Israel and Burma have signed but not ratified the CWC and do not participate in the OPCW inspections.

 

Therefore, the bulk of what remains are the undeclared inventories of non-CWC countries, most notably Egypt (and North Korea). Speculation about Israeli CW is weak.  Israeli nuclear deterrent would seem to remove their need for CW.  And there is the Israeli historical repulsion to chemical weapons from the Nazi era.

Assessments about Egypt’s inventory are more consistent.  Like Syria, Egypt has long had the military objective of countering Israeli nuclear potential (and North Korea off-setting the US and South Korea according to whatever logic applies in their thinking).  Egypt is the one country that now sticks out in the world as a CW outlier.  Given Egyptian internal uncertainties, it is unlikely they will act on this issue any time soon.

 

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UN Security Council Resolution on Syrian CW–Good, But Who’s in Charge?

Posted on September 29, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

The UN process took a good step forward with the approval of UNSCR 2118 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11135.doc.htm).

It is important to remember that this will be the mechanism for eliminating the Syrian CW. The other UN activity–headed by Ake Sellstrom and presently in Syria–has the task of investigating the use of CW. These are two separate missions and sets of people–easily confused.

Timing and coordination of the new resolution was tricky since the it had to subsume/bless the action of the Executive Council of the OPCW which drafted its own mandate for implementing an accelerated Syrian CW destruction program (as desired by the UNSC). Both required negotiation between Russia, US and others. The UN Security Council resolution could not be passed until the OPCW piece was agreed and it is a formal annex to the UNSCR 2118.

Still unclear is the simple question of who will be in charge? The relationship between the Director General of OPCW and the Security Council seems still murky. The Director General is a Turkish diplomat, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü. The Syrian task is not the usual sort of matter that OPCW takes up. It may require the full-time attention of a very senior and seasoned individual. The prescriptions for reporting in the new resolution (Operative Paragraph 8) have the DG of OPCW reporting to the Secretary General who reports to the Security Council. This leaves open the possibility for the Secretary General to name a special representative for that function. In operational paragraph 8, the Council requests the Secretary General to submit to it, within 10 days “recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program.” Stay tuned on this.

A couple of essential points in the resolution include:

The authorization of member states to “acquire, control, transport, transfer, and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director General of the OPCW…” This is needed to allow CW agent and munitions to be removed from Syria for destruction. Under the CWC, this is otherwise prohibited.

The Security Council resolution states that Syria must provide unfettered access to all inspectors. Under OPCW procedures, an inspected country may refuse admission of certain inspectors (e.g. inspectors from hostile countries) if they choose. This removes that choice from Syria.

In Annex 1, which is the document approved by the Executive Council of the OPCW, there are a couple of key points related to timing. First, Syria must provide much more information on their program infrastructure–within 7 days. This will form the basis for inspectors to plan their work program.

Syria is also required to destroy CW production equipment (under the supervision of inspectors) by the end of October. During the same period, inspectors are mandated to complete their survey inspections of all sites provided in the Syrian declarations. They are mandated to start by October 1, this Tuesday.

Getting this done will require more people than OPCW has on hand. My rough estimate is a team of about 75 in-country. You need some basic support people for whatever base location they establish in Damascus–communications, motor pool, expeditors, linguists, etc. Maybe this is 15 people. To go through 40-50 sites in a month and do direct the follow-on destruction activities (and record in detail) I would guess 4 teams of 15 people each. Each team will need maybe five SUVs. The teams will have communications, an operations officer, safety officer, CW experts, etc. Some sites will be easy to inspect, but imagine going into a bunker with dozens or hundreds of munitions which have to be counted and recorded. Imagine making a detailed record of containers of bulk CW agents and precursor chemicals. It can be done, but it will take time and a pool of experienced inspectors. OPCW notes it needs more people and the authority to hire them in its Executive Council Decisions (para 2 e).

There will be many issues ahead. For example, who decides which munitions get destroyed and according to what criteria? In the case of UNSCOM and Iraq, we destroyed munitions that had been used to deliver prohibited agent and/or had a prohibited (long) range. In the Syrian case, will inspectors destroy all Syria’s Scuds if they can prove (likely) that Syria has produced CW warheads for the Scuds (in addition to the usual high explosive warhead)? Or, will they only destroy the CW warheads for the Scuds? There may be many such cases for other types of missiles and rockets.

I discussed these issues and others at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson Center Friday 27 September which can be viewed at C-span:

http://www.c-span.org/Events/Fmr-UN-Official-Discusses-Syria-Chemical-Weapons/10737441729-1/

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The Syrian CW Declaration…So far, so good

Posted on September 23, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

Syria has taken the first critical step in the process laid out by Lavrov and Kerry last week in Geneva. Damascus made its initial declaration of its chemical weapons inventory and infrastructure to the technical secretariat of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Initial leaks are that it is in line with expectations. Recall that one very remarkable element of the Lavrov-Kerry meeting was that they agreed on a general assessment of the Syrian inventory. How often do US and Russian intelligence assessments agree?

The fact that Syria’s submission is not surprising. Lavrov is too shrewd to push this process this far and not be pretty confident that Bashar al-Assad would make good on private commitments to Russia about delivering a decent declaration. I suspect that Russia will keep the pressure on Assad as a way of building international legitimacy not only for Assad but for Russia’s defense of Assad.

The declaration will go to 41 countries tomorrow and naturally it will leak. Here are a couple things to look for:

Has Syria declared current stocks only, or have they detailed stocks they may have had but destroyed. Syria’s program is decades old. Agent manufactured in the 1970’s would likely be beyond is “best if used by” date. Probably they did not just toss their old mustard agent in the Mediterranean (though some countries, like Egypt were rumored to have done just that). In other words Syria probably has some CW destruction capability that it will declare. It will be interesting to see if that can be configured for destruction of their current stocks and mitigate the international problem of getting rid of the stuff. (Also, accounting for the production and disposition of decades of agent production will be very challenging, but it will be far easier if Syria has good accounting.)

Also, look for the designated locations. According to reports, Syria has been moving this stuff around pretty regularly. It will be interesting to see if they declare just the fixed permanent sites or whether there were other sites…perhaps taken over by rebels…that they declare. This could contribute to the Russian contention that rebels could have obtained Syrian CW. That would require some real scrutiny by inspectors because any such claim could be real difficult to verify. It could provide a “balancing entry” for discrepancies in inventory.

When looking at the list, also think about how you could phase the destruction activities. There are parts of any CW infrastructure that are vital and relatively easy to destroy such as key precursor chemicals (alcohol) and specialized production equipment (e.g. glass-lined reactor vessels). Getting the vital parts done quickly will presumably be a priority.

Ironically, but not surprisingly, the immediate problems ahead have less to do with Syria than the UN and the Security Council. The roles and missions of the OPCW, the Security Council and individual members have yet to be ironed out. The OPCW Executive Committee was to meet last week, but the proposal for beefing up the inspection procedures for Syria was not yet agreed by Russia and the US. This week will be a jam of OPCW, the UN Security Council, and the UN General Assembly (Pity the Obama speechwriters who 14 days ago were drafting text justifying a military strike on Syria against the UN wishes. Now, they have a completely different story.)

A key disagreement is between the US and Russia over whether a UN resolution on Syrian CW disbarment would be passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter or not. For Russia, passage under Chapter 7 means there is an explicit threat of military action for non-compliance. They hate that in general and with regard to Syrian in particular. The US has already said they are prepared to conduct a military strike unilaterally.

However, the US seems to think they need a Chapter 7 resolution to accommodate the more vigorous goals for Syria that go beyond the normal OPCW procedures for countries signing up for the CWC. For example, the CWC prohibits transferring CW to another country, but that’s one of the most likely avenues to get rid of Syrian CW, for example shipping to Russia or another European country for destruction.

Another example is that under the CWC, an inspected country can decline to admit inspectors it does not want…such as Americans. To make the inspection process more vigorous, Washington wants a Chapter 7 resolution irrespective of the use of force issue. This is a solvable problem, but it will take scribes time to work out language.

One big step that would help is naming a senior seasoned diplomat to run the special functions of Syrian disarmament. The right person can do a lot. In the end, decisions on the ground between the inspectors and the Syrians will drive progress and confidence. Probably this will mean someone who will report to both the UN Security Council and less importantly, to the Director General of OPCW. Watch the debate and agreement between the US and Russia on a chairman and his/her reporting arrangements.

Also, watch for other countries offering to participate in this effort. Multiple countries could assist in CW destruction. Getting the CW to fixed points and then to a secure site on the coast (perhaps a Russian base?) is not insurmountable.

It is still remarkable what Bashar al-Assad has undertaken. I doubt any American analyst would have predicted that step. Consider the internal debates in Syria. Bashar is ordering his civilian and military powers to give up their strongest deterrent against Israel among others. It is a big step that will crush the interests of many in the Syrian system, possibly creating severe internal dissent. What US president would order getting rid of nuclear weapons? Under what pressure? American leaders find it impossible to cancel any major weapons development program (no matter how expensive or impractical). This is a big deal for Bashar. He may be strengthened by it internationally, but also weakened by it internally. It will be interesting to watch.

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The Syrian Framework Agreement

Posted on September 15, 2013 by Charles Duelfer

The Framework agreement and its two annexes get many things right. The burden of proof and all the heavy lifting are on Syria. The UN weapons inspectors are meant to verify Syrian declarations, direct the aggregation and ultimate disposal of the CW inventory and infrastructure. There is a timeline that is short, but possible.

Very interesting is the statement that Russian and American intelligence assessments of Syrian CW are now similar. That means once Syria declares their inventory (in days), there US and Russia will be able to judge if Damascus is being forthcoming.

Muddying the waters are two things. One is the question of who is in charge of the inspections. The Framework agreement is unclear (to put it mildly) on the roles of: a) the Organization for the Prevention fo Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention; b) a special Syrian specific UN group (not defined), and c) direct roles for US and Russian experts. While the timelines for Syria actions are tight, a problem may emerge if the UN cannot clearly define who is doing what on the inspector side. Who will be in charge? The Russians probably are arguing to make this as similar to a normal CWC party accession as possible. However, the US probably wants a special group. If for no other reason than it distinguishes it from the Israel position.

This points to another potential problem. Secretary Kerry went to Israel for consultations immediately after this Syrian agreement. That will have the effect of highlighting the fact that Israel has not ratified the CWC and will potentially open the opportunity for Bashir al-Assad to divert attention from himself to Israel and its WMD position. This could muddy the waters considerably. What had been a narrowly defined clear objective of addressing Syrian CW could turn into a mess of competing objectives. This could rear foot the White House again. Especially, if the Syrians start dragging their feet and the prospect of a unilateral military strike becomes imminent. Prominently bringing Israel into this issue now will make everything–especially for the White House, much harder.

Nevertheless, the prospects for achieving CW disarmament of Syrian are better than they were a week ago.

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