IAEA Inspectors will be in a difficult position as the
international community will inevitably look to them for “truth” about Iran. This is similar to Iraq case, but the comparisons with Iraq are otherwise limited. The data on the Iran case is overwhelming. Where IAEA is now in a jam is investigating the specific question of weaponization activities that evidence suggests took place. This is going to be tough, and the recent IAEA trip to Tehran came up empty. Tehran, apparently has not even given them enough to sustain a “process” of investigation. This is surprising since an ongoing dialogue would buy time for Iran and tend to sustain ambiguity about their intentions regarding nuclear weapons.

IAEA Director General IAEA chief Yukio Amano has wisely stated that the burden of proof is on Iran. This is correct, but you can be sure some will try to pin it on IAEA…like Russia or China. Not that I am sympathetic to Iran, but it is worth noting that even if Iran is innocent, it may be tough for them to prove it…As my Iraqi counterparts told me in the 1990s and even after the fall of Saddam, they were tasked with proving a negative regarding WMD….they had an impossible task in a way…especially since no one was inclined to give Saddam the benefit of the doubt. Saddam himself was puzzled on this…but that is another matter.

Ultimately the question regarding Iran is one of their intentions. Israel (which has experience in developing clandestine nuclear capability) seems convinced Iran has already made a decision to acquire a weapon and ballistic missile delivery. The US, as expressed by Leon Panetta (on 60 minutes 29 January 2012) has a different take, i.e. that they have not taken steps to weaponize yet, but such steps (whatever they are) would constitute a redline. The US has said an Iran nuclear weapon was “unacceptable.” There is no dispute that as time goes on and the “civilian” Iran nuclear efforts proceed, the breakout time between the moment Iran does something which unambiguously demonstrates their intent to produce a nuclear weapon, and the moment it has the weapon, is getting shorter…probably now on the order of months rather than years. They have ballistic missiles. They are now enriching to 20% highly enriched uranium. They can go to 90%…they have the knowledge and infrastructure. They probably have a workable weapons design. (Recall Iran was a good customer of Pakistan weapons designer A.Q Khan.) And they have an incentive. From Tehran’s perspective, nuclear weapons would seem pretty useful. When did we get rid of Saddam? After he got rid of WMD. When did we get rid of Qadaffi? After he got rid of WMD. Pakistan and India skipped into the nuclear club and what price did they pay? North Korea, is a case that I doubt Tehran draws too much from, but they do share technology.

So looking at the clock, it certainly seems that 2012 will be a decision year for Iran and the international community. Israel, if it concludes it must stop (or delay substantially) the Iran program has relatively limited military capacity to do this and as time goes on, the target gets harder. Politically (and probably militarily), Israel would need some support from the US…getting strong US support is more likely before the November elections than after. An upcoming visit to Washington (March 5, 2012) by Prime Minister Netanyahu will give them a reading on this point. A key question for Israel will be whether the US will commit to military action if the sanctions do not force Iran to quit their enrichment program (which is what Israel requires as unmistakable evidence that Iran has stopped). The US has had strong anti-nuclear weapons policies before that it has allowed to lapse…e.g. Pakistan and North Korea. This will be noted by both Israel and Iran. Indeed, serious debate in Washington over the potential cost of acting militarily against the Iran program vice relying on deterrence to contain a nuclear Tehran is on-going.

One other major difference between the Iraq case and Iran….Saddam was far more impervious to effects of sanctions than Iran….Saddam was relatively immune to the pain of the people….Tehran is much less a cult of personality and is relatively more vulnerable to the population (which is switched on in ways Iraq was not–Iraqis had no internet or cell phones…was not). Sanctions will be far more potent in Iran…now whether they generate support for the leadership or cause them to bend to international will is another judgment….and there are arguments on both sides. It is worth considering that Tehran may think that they have leverage over the Obama administration via the increased price of gas–which could be an election issue.

Its possible that the consequences of a military strike may not be that large (though the uncertainty and risk is certainly high). Israel hit the Iraqi program in 1981 and Syrian reactor in 2007. Not much happened. If they hit Iran, what would Iran do? The day after, the sympathy of the world towards Tehran would probably be higher. The UN would likely consider lifting or relaxing sanctions. The domestic support for the regime might be bolstered. Would Tehran jeopardize this by lashing out in various ways? I don’t know. Maybe. Maybe they would try to close the straits of Hormuz and that would force the US Navy to act. Maybe Hezbollah would rain rockets down on Israel. But would that really be in Iran’s interest? I suspect that Russia and China would strongly advise a measured response. Presumably Tehran would want to export oil and resume a revenue flow. That would be inhibited by a military response

These questions will be gamed out in Tel Aviv, Washington, Tehran, and other capitals during the months ahead and there will be a decision…even if it is to do nothing.

It would be nice if it were true that nuclear weapons did not matter. Some offer that nuclear weapons are only useful in the abstract, that it is their potential that matters because if you used them, it would be suicide. Therefore, if we just said we don’t care, or that we can simply deter another nuclear weapon state, it’s manageable. Unfortunately, it is very uncertain whether this logic applies in Tehran. That would be a very risky bet. Many things can go wrong. Even in the US-Soviet balance, there were moments (besides the Cuban Missile Crisis), when we came inadvertently close to disaster.

In the meantime the IAEA will remain in the crucible and many actors will seek to shift some burden of judgment upon them…I wish them luck in what will be a very difficult time ahead.

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