Comparisons between the intelligence assessments of nuclear weapons activities on the part of Saddam’s Iraq and today’s Iran are misleading.

Certainly the pre-war intelligence assessments concerning Saddam’s nuclear weapons programs were wildly wrong.  However, they were produced from astonishingly small amounts of data, using terribly flawed analytic tradecraft to support a single hypothesis—that Saddam maintained an on-going effort to develop nuclear weapons.  From past experience with Saddam, it was expected that he would build nuclear weapons at the earliest opportunity and, therefore, any data the intelligence community received was tied to this notion.  Information was sparse and sometimes bogus.  The tendency was to see the paucity of data as a consequence of great deception on the part of Saddam rather than (as we later learned) a consequence of a decision on his part to defer a nuclear effort until such time as the sanctions had been lifted and the international community otherwise occupied.

In the case of Iran, there are, unquestionably, substantial nuclear infrastructure and developments that Saddam never had.  Iran has an extensive nuclear power program and nuclear enrichment efforts that are declared and plain to see.  They also have a long range ballistic missile program that is clear and observable to all.  The uncertainty concerns whether Tehran has clandestine efforts to design and build a nuclear weapon that can go on one of their missiles.  Whether by intent or not, the declared path that Iran is following (developing enrichment capacity and missiles) will substantially reduce their lead time to building an actual weapon–if they have not already made that decision.  The potential for Iran to produce a weapon in relatively short order is growing—even excluding the substantial concerns that they have worked on weapons design and may be continuing such efforts now.

This is the rub.  Countries concerned about an Iranian nuclear weapon are not going to be able to be patient and wait until, as some have suggested, “it be proved through the analysis of current, solid information—not recycled, discredited data.”  Countries who see an Iran nuclear weapon as a severe threat will have to either convince themselves that Iran is not going nuclear (Iran could facilitate that if it chose to cease enrichment activities) or, they will have to do something to prevent it (military action), or they will have to decide to live with it.  All are grindingly tough choices.

And, the data that supported the concern about Iran’s designing a weapon is not trivial, or, as one former IAEA inspector casts it, “recycled, discredited.”   The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate noted that weaponization efforts had apparently been suspended or halted in 2003.  That does not mean such a halt was permanent.  Later data shared with the IAEA suggests that the capacity to conduct further work is certainly possible and there were activities which in fact suggested such weapons development work might be continuing.  Iran has refused to address these questions put to it by the IAEA.  It is important to note that the burden of proof is not on the IAEA in this dynamic.

It may well be that Iran has not taken a decision to build a nuclear weapon.  It may be that they have chosen simply to be in a position to build one on short notice.  The intelligence community will never be able to get “current solid information” on Tehran’s intentions.  Yet countries will have to make extraordinary decisions about how long to let Iran’s work continue before they commit to one of the three positions cited above.  The IAEA has been extraordinarily helpful in illuminating the circumstances in Iran.  It is not their job, however, to prove that Iran has a nuclear weapon program.  They can only raise questions and evaluate the information they receive from Tehran.

The circumstances are entirely different from Iraq.  There is a broad factual basis of Iranian capacity that dwarfs that of Saddam in 2002.  Now, a decade later, Tehran will have learned from Saddam’s experiences.  And, given the pace of developments in Iran, it is pretty certain that some countries will have to make tough decisions in 2012 about just how much risk they are willing to accept.